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Gilbert Merritt, Jr.*
I. LLITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Municipal Home Rule
B. "Suspension " of General Law by Private Act
C. Special Legislation Altering Term of Local Office






III. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS-ALLOCATION OF TVA TAX EQUIVALENTS
BETW EEN CITY AND COUNTY
Local government cases usually make dry reading, but this year
one unusual dispute gives some insight into the customs and court-
house politics in one of Tennessee's smaller counties. The county
judge and the county register of deeds (a lady) disagreed about office
space in the courthouse. The county judge wanted to swap offices
with the lady, but she refused. So after talking to the sheriff about
it, the judge knocked holes in the lady's wall; whereupon she got an
injunction. Judge Shriver, speaking for the court of appeals, said
the sheriff could not give the judge permission to knock the lady's
wall down. Judge Shriver found a section of the Tennessee Code
vesting in the quarterly county court supervision of the courthouse
and observed, in passing, that "learned counsel failed to take note of"
this code section which solves the whole problem for everyone con-
cerned.1
The disputes in the other local government cases to be discussed
are not quite so personal, but many of the cases are of special im-
portance, growing out of efforts to change the boundaries and struc-
ture or improve the services of local government. Several settle
*Assistant Metropolitan Attorney for Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee;
Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
1. Driver v. Thompson, 358 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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complex questions of constitutional law relating to home rule,
consolidation of local governmental functions, and the validity of local
legislation which conflicts with general law.
I. LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF LocAL GOVERNMENT
Tennessee's constitution, like the constitutions of most states, con-
tains several provisions limiting the power of the legislature to pass
private or special legislation affecting units of local government.
There were five survey cases interpreting three of these limiting pro-
visions.
A. Municipal Home Rule
The lengthy home rule section of the state constitution, quoted in
the footnote below, was adopted in 1953 and was designed to prevent
legislative control of the internal affairs of municipalities choosing to
adopt "home rule."2 The legislature may pass private legislation
affecting a county or a non-home rule municipality alone so long as
the chief legislative body or the people of the local government
2. "[1] Any municipality may by ordinance submit to its qualified voters in a
general or special election the question: 'Shall this municipality adopt home rule'?
"[2] In the event of an affirmative vote by a majority of the qualified voters
voting thereon, and until the repeal thereof by the same procedure, such municipality
shall be a home rule municipality, and the General Assembly shall act with respect
to such home rule municipality only by laws which are general in terms and effect.
"[3] Any municipality after adopting home rule may continue to operate under
its existing charter, or amend the same, or adopt and thereafter amend a new charter
to provide for its governmental and proprietary powers, duties and functions, and
for the form, structure, personnel and organization of its government, provided that no
charter provision except with respect to compensation of municipal personnel shall
be effective if inconsistent with any general act of the General Assembly and provided
further that the power of taxation of such municipality shall not be enlarged or
increased except by General Act of the General Assembly. The General Assembly
shall by general law provide the exclusive methods by which municipalities may be
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries may
be altered.
"[4] A charter or amendment may be proposed [a] by ordinance of any home
rule municipality, [b] by a charter commission provided for by Act of the General
Assembly and elected by the qualified voters of a home rule municipality voting
thereon, [c] or, in the absence of such act of the General Assembly, by a charter
commission of seven (7) members, chosen at large not more often than once in two
(2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to petition for such election signed by
qualified voters for a home rule municipality not less in number than ten (10%) per
cent of those voting in the then most recent general municipal election." TENN. CONSr.
art. 11, § 9.
For a good brief discussion of home rule, see Fordham, Local Government in the
Larger Scheme of Things, 8 VA~N. L. REv. 667 (1955). See also AmERic~ Mumci-
PAL Ass'N, MODEL CoNsrruToNAL PROvisIONs FOR HomE RuLE (1953); Bromage,
Home Rule NML Model, 44 NAT'L MuNIc. REv. 132 (1955); Fordham, Home Rule
AMA Model, 44 NAT'L Mumc. REv. 137 (1955).
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ratifies the legislation.3 But the home rule section of the constitution
requires that the legislature act upon home rule municipalities "only
by laws which are general in terms and effect." The basic theory is
that a home rule municipality may act without seeking prior state
approval but remains subject to all limitations imposed by uniform
state action.
Since 1953 only 10 of Tennessee's 284 municipalities have adopted
home rule, and Washington County Election Commission v. Johnson
City4 is the first reported case interpreting the home rule section of
the constitution. Prior to the institution of the suit, the voters of
Johnson City answered affirmatively the home rule question submitted
by ordinance under paragraph one of this section. This action pre-
vented the legislature from amending the city's charter, and so the
city operated for a while under its existing charter before an attempt
was made to adopt a new one drafted by an elected charter commis-
sion. Under the home rule section, a charter may be proposed to the
voters (1) by ordinance, (2) by a charter commission established
under legislative act, and (3) by a charter commission elected "pur-
suant to a petition.., signed by" not less than ten per cent of the
voters.5 The last of these three methods was used, and a petition was
filed calling for the election of charter commissioners.
By suit for declaratory judgment, the local election commission,
which was to hold the election for members of the charter commis-
sion, questioned the source of its own authority to hold the election
and the qualifications, compensation, terms of office, and duties of the
charter commission. It asked the court to determine whether the
home rule section is "self-executing" allowing the home--rule muni-
cipality to fill in these details by ordinance without requiring state
legislative or judicial implementation. With clarity, Justice Felts
established as self-executing the portion of the home rule amendment
permitting the drafting of a charter by commissioners selected in an
election called for by petition. The court reasoned that this constitu-
tional provision assumes the existence of the procedures for selecting
the commissioners and further "assumes" that these procedures may
be established "by the legislative body of the municipality."6 The
case holds that this portion of the home rule amendment relating to
the drafting of charters, as well as the portion permitting a munici-
pality to adopt home rule, is not dependent upon prior action by
the state legislature. Justice Felts' interpretation of this portion of
the home rule provision is surely correct in view of the fact that the
3. TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9, para. 2.
4. 209 Tenn. 131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961).
5. See note 2 supra at paragraph 4 in brackets.
6. 209 Tenn. at 140, 350 S.W.2d at 605.
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provision allows a charter to be proposed by a commission established
under legislative act and says that "in the absence of such acte'7 a
charter may be drafted by commissioners selected in an election called
for by petition.
B. "Suspension" of General Law by Private Act
The constitutional limitation on legislative control of local
government which has proved most troublesome for the courts is
the first sentence of section 8 of article XI, originally adopted in the
Constitution of 1834 and carried over in the present Constitution of
1870. This sentence provides that the legislature "shall have no
power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular
individual, nor to pass any law for individuals inconsistent with the
general laws of the state .... " Since its adoption in 1834, the courts
have construed this provision to prohibit forms of special legislation
relating to "individuals" which conflict with general law, but origi-
nally the sentence was held inapplicable to special legislation incon-
sistent with a general law relating to local governments because
counties and municipalities are not "individuals," the word used in
the constitutional provision.8 This distinction no longer exists, how-
ever, because gradually the courts applied the sentence to invalidate
types of legislation relating to units of local government on the theory
that the legislation affected not only a county or municipality in the
abstract but also the "individuals" subject to its jurisdiction
The local government cases in which the section has been applied
are numerous and inconsistent. 0 The principles underlying the de-
cisions are often unclear because the court simply states its decisions
in the form of conclusions that the special legislation either does or
does not conflict with general law. In each session the legislature con-
tinues to exclude certain counties and towns from the operation of
general laws, and the courts need to formulate the set of principles
which control their decisions in these cases so that a measure of
order and predictability can be brought to this important area of
constitutional and local government law.
Before discussing the survey cases applying this section of the
7. Note 2 supra, at paragraph 4 in brackets.
8. E.g., State v. Wilson, 80 TENN. 246 (1883); State v. Rauscher, 69 Tenn. 96
(1878).
9. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569
(1960); State ex rel. Bales v. Hamilton County, 170 Tenn. 371, 95 S.W.2d 618
(1936); Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907); Coyne v. City of
Memphis, 118 Tenn. 651, 102 S.W. 355 (1907); Redistricting Cases, 111 Tenn. 234, 80
S.W. 750 (1903).




constitution, I want to illustrate the inconsistent pattern of the
precedent with which the supreme court is faced. In one case, the
general act required the allocation of school funds between county
and city school systems according to the number of children in each
system, but it expressly allowed this allocation principle to be altered
by private act. A private act requiring that Memphis and Shelby
County apportion school funds on a fifty-fifty basis was invalidated
on the ground that Tennessee's uniform system of public education
demands that local allocation formulas conform to the allocation
formula provided by general law.' Yet in two earlier cases involving
the state's uniform system of public education the court upheld a
private act deviating from general law by establishing a different
system for hiring, discharging, and promoting teachers12 and a private
act authorizing the establishment of a municipal school system in a
manner inconsistent with general law authorizing the creation of
such school systems.13
The state supreme court has upheld private acts applicable to only
one county or municipality in the following kinds of cases: (1)
private acts allowing special ad valorem tax levy in excess of the
maximum allowed to counties by general legislation;14 (2) private
act changing county court form of government established by general
act to council-manager or commission form of government;" (3)
private act authorizing operation of electric power company by
municipality in manner inconsistent with a general law empowering
municipalities to operate such utilities;16 (4) private act authorizing
refunding of municipal bonds in manner not authorized by general
bond law.' 7 On the other hand, the supreme court has invalidated
private acts in the following types of cases: (1) private act fixing
compensation of clerk of local court at a sum below that provided by
general law;18 (2) private act allowing justices of the peace to serve
on county board of education when not allowed to do so by general
act;' 9 (3) private act authorizing taxation of taxicabs when general
law prohibited such taxation;20 (4) private act declaring city charter
11. Board of Educ. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569 (1960).
12. Knoxville v. State ex rel. Hayward, 175 Tenn. 159, 133 S.W.2d 465 (1939).
But cf. State ex rel. Bales v. Hamilton County, supra note 9 (private act establishing
minimum salary level for teachers in one county invalidated).
13. Robertson v. Englewood, 174 Tenn. 92, 123 S.W.2d 1090 (1939).
14. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry v. Rhea County, 194 Tenn. 167, 250 S.W.2d 60
(1952).
15. Ragon v. Thrasher, 194 Tenn. 463, 253 S.W.2d 31 (1952).
16. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d
441 (1936).
17. Soukup v. Sell, 171 Tenn. 347, 104 S.W.2d 830 (1937).
18. Freeman v. Swan, 192 Tenn. 146, 237 S.W.2d 964 (1951).
19. Algee v. State ex rel. Makin, 200 Tenn. 127, 290 S.W.2d 869 (1956).
20. City of Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864 (1956).
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could be modified only by act of legislature when general law pro-
vided other methods for altering or repealing existing charters;21 (5)
private act abolishing and re-establishing office of superintendent
of public schools in a manner different from that provided by general
law;z2 (6) private act creating municipal board of election commis-
sion to hold elections for municipal offices when general law em-
powered county election commissions to hold such elections.23
This inconsistent pattern of prior cases increased the difficulty of
the supreme court's task in deciding four local government survey
cases challenging special legislation under this section of the constitu-
tion. In two of the cases, the private acts were upheld; in one, the
private act was invalidated; in the other, the court upheld a private
act open to two constructions by adopting the construction which
would not place it in conflict with general law.
In State ex rel. Taylor v Rasnake2 4 a county board of education
transferred a principal with permanent tenure from one school to
another at a reduced salary in the face of a special teacher's tenure
act for the county preventing the board from reducing the salary of
such an employee when changing him from one position to another.
The general teacher's tenure act allows the school board to transfer
teachers within the system; and the silence of the general act with
respect to salary reduction appears to permit the board to transfer
a teacher to a new location at a reduced salary. There is a conflict
between the general and private acts in the sense that a board opera-
ting under the general act is free from the transfer restrictions imposed
by the private act. Counsel for the board asked the court to follow
State ex rel. Bales v. Hamilton County,25 in which the court invalidated
a private act imposing on Hamilton County a minimum salary scale
for teachers because it was in conflict with the general law which
imposed no such restrictions on other counties. Justice Burnett
ignored the similarity between the two cases and upheld the private
act in the Rasnake case saying, "the Private Act before us was passed
for the purpose of advancing education" by giving teachers "a reason-
able protection of not being transferred to a position paying a lower
salary without first being given notice and having charges preferred
against them." "This act," he explained, "instead of being contrary
to the General School Law ... is substantially in compliance there-
21. Furnace v. City of Dayton, 197 Tenn. 447, 274 S.W.2d 6 (1954).
22. Hamilton County v. McCanless, 199 Tenn. 128, 285 S.W.2d 118 (1955).
23. Clark v. Vaughn, 177 Tenn. 76, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1951) (a well-considered
opinion by Justice Chambliss emphasizing the importance of statewide uniformity of
election laws).
24. 209 Tenn. 229, 352 S.W.2d 427 (1961).
25. 170 Tenn. 371, 95 S.W.2d 618 (1936).
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with, though in some instances the wording may be different."26
The general law in State ex rel. Town of Arlington v. Shelby
County Election Commission27 allowed each incorporated town in a
county one representative in the county's legislative body without
regard to population, and the court invalidated a private act for the
state's largest county designed partially to correct the malapportion-
ment of the legislative body by limiting such representation to towns
with populations over 1000. The legislature passed the private act
in 1935 leaving the town without a representative until 1961 when this
suit testing the private act was filed. The private act "is in direct
contravention of this general statute," Justice White declared, "and,
if held constitutional, would deny to the citizens of the City of
Arlington the same representation in their county court as granted
to the citizens of other incorporated towns of the state .... 2
The general law in White v. Davidson County allows the sheriff
to purchase supplies out of the fees of his office and the question was
whether the private act should be construed to require that his pur-
chases be made through the county purchasing agency. The court
construed the private act as inapplicable to the sheriff's office because
"it is the court's duty to adopt the construction that would save the
statute."30
In Frazer v. Carr,31 opponents attacked the consolidation of local
governments in Nashville and Davidson County on several grounds,
one of which was that the private act establishing the metropolitan
charter commission suspended general law. The 1957 general enabling
act allowing consolidation in counties with populations over 200,000
requires as a first step toward consolidation that the county and its
largest city by concurrent ordinances authorize the establishment of
a charter commission. Under the general act the concurrent ordi-
nances could provide for the selection of a charter commission in one
of two ways-either by election at large, or by appointment by the
chief executive officers of the county and city. In 1961 this general
act was amended by allowing a charter commission to be created by
private act, and a private act was then passed appointing the com-
missioners to draft a consolidation charter for Nashville and Davidson
County. Opponents challenged the charter on the ground that the
private act creating the charter commission was invalid. They cited
the Shelby County School Boarda1 case heretofore mentioned in
26. 209 Tenn. at 234, 352 S.W.2d at 429.
27. 209 Tenn. 289, 352 S.W.2d 809 (1961).
28. Id. at 303, 352 S.W.2d at 815.
29. 360 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1962).
30. Id. at 20.
31. 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962).
32. Note 11 supra.
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which a private act requiring the allocation of school funds on a
fifty-fifty basis between city and county school systems was invalidated
because the general law required allocation according to school
population, though it expressly allowed the allocation formula to be
changed by private act. The court chose not to follow this case,
however, and upheld the private act apparently on the ground that
the problems of consolidation vary from one locality to another and
special legislation to initiate consolidation in a particular area may
be needed. Since there is no need for uniform state action in this
respect, the court found a reasonable basis for the special legislation.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the cases decided
under this section will not support the proposition that special
legislation which conflicts with or deviates from general law is
necessarily invalid. Though the court does not often phrase its
decisions in terms of a principle of equal protection, the cases, while
inconsistent, indicate that the purpose of this section of the constitu-
tion is to prevent legislation which singles out one locality for special
treatment in the absence of a reasonable basis for the deviation from
general law.
The court often seems to be considering a number of factors in
deciding cases under this section. The purpose of the general act
and the nature of the conflict created by the private act are important
considerations. For example, if the general act is designed to estab-
lish minimum standards, a private act which raises these standards
for a particular locality will usually be upheld while a private act
lowering them will usually be invalidated. 33 Another important
question is whether the field of legislation covered in the general act
demands uniform state action. For example, some statutes establish-
ing procedures would become worthless if undermined by a patch-
work of special legislation while no important interest is disturbed
if some procedure-creating statutes are changed for one locality. A
third factor is whether the special legislation is beneficial. Often,
needed reforms in general law come first by private act for one
locality, and later the general law is repealed and the private act
expanded into a general act with state-wide application.
One can perhaps state the principles underlying these cases as
follows: A private act which deviates from general law is invalid if
the activity or field of legislation covered by the general law re-
quires uniform legislation throughout the state. If the field of
33. Compare State ex rel. Taylor v. Rasnake,, supra note 24 (private act upheld
giving teachers in one locality more protection than general act designed to establish
minimum standards for protection of teachers), with Freeman v. Swan, supra note 18




legislation covered by the general act does not require unform state
action, the private act is valid unless it establishes standards "lower"
than those of the general act. These principles require the court to
examine closely the purposes of the general act, to evaluate the need
for uniform state action and determine whether the standards estab-
lished by the private act are "higher" or "lower" than those of the
general act.
It would be helpful not only to the bar but also to the legislative
branch if the court would set out more clearly the reasons underlying
its decisions in this area of local government law. In one sense the
court makes the decision more palatable by stating it in terms of
whether the private act does or does not conflict with general law.
It indicates that a rule is being applied and lends a note of inevitability
to the decision. In fact, however, it is difficult to predict decisions
and the law will remain in a state of confusion so long as the court
does not state the policy reasons which give support to its holdings.
C. Special Legislation Altering Term of Local Office
The second paragraph of article XI, section 9 of the constitution,
adopted in 1953, prohibits the legislature from abolishing a local
office by special act or altering the term or salary thereof "prior to
the end of" the term. The purpose of this amendment is to protect
the officeholder from hasty legislative action which singles him out
for special treatment, but it allows the alteration of local offices by
general act.
Because the Nashville consolidation charter altered local offices
prior to their expiration and was drafted by a committee appointed
by special act, the question was raised in the metropolitan govern-
ment case3 whether this constitutional provision limits the power of
the legislature to consolidate local governments by private act. The
last paragraph of article XI, section 9, also adopted in 1953, says that
the legislature "may provide for the consolidation" of a county with
the municipalities therein. If the provision prohibiting alteration of
terms of office were construed as a limitation on the consolidation
power, it would mean that the consolidation power may be exercised
only through general legislation since consolidation of local functions
usually requires the alteration of offices and departments prior to the
expiration of the terms of present officeholders. The court found it
unnecessary to decide this question, however, because one section
of the 1957 general consolidation enabling act provides that "after
said consolidation no officer or agency ... shall retain any right ...
34. Frazer v. Carr, supra note 31.
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unless this chapter or the charter of the metropolitan government
shall expressly so provide . . . ."3 The court held that the local
officers were abolished by this general law rather than private act
even though in the final analysis it was within the discretion of the
charter commission appointed by private act to retain or eliminate
such offices. Since the framers of the consolidation amendment ap-
parently intended to allow consolidation by private act,36 the court
could have reached the same conclusion by holding that the limitation
on legislative power expressed in the abolition-of-office provision
of the constitution does not apply to the power granted in the con-
solidation provision because consolidation by private act would
otherwise be practically impossible. The case holds that the provision
is not violated by a general law giving a local charter commission
created by private act the power to alter offices prior to the expiration
of their terms but leaves open the question whether this may be done
by a private consolidation act.
II. ALTERATION OF LocAL GOVERNMENTAL BouNDAs AND STRuCTURE
A. Annexation
Unlike cities in many states, Tennessee cities may annex territory
by ordinance without a petition or vote of the people in the city or the
annexed area when, in the words of the statute, "it appears that the
prosperity of such municipality and territory will be materially
retarded and the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property
thereof endangered" unless annexation takes place.37 The statute
provides for judicial review to determine whether the annexation is
"unreasonable in consideration of the health, safety and welfare of the
citizens and property owners of the territory sought to be annexed
and the citizens and property owners of the municipality."- In State
ex rel. Schmittou v. City of Nashville and State ex rel. Hardison v.
City of Columbia,0 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld annexation
ordinances of Nashville and Columbia annexing 42 square miles
(80,000 people) and 900 lots (1827 people) respectively. The court
upheld the annexations on the ground that they raise a "fairly de-
batable question ... as to whether or not the ordinance is reason-
able."41 It appears that the court has concluded that it need not
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3702 (Supp. 1962).
36. See Mendelson, Consolidation of County and City Functions and Other Devices
for Simplifying Tennessee Local Government, 8 VA.ND. L. REV. 878, 881 (1955).
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (Supp. 1962).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-310 (Supp. 1962).
39. 208 Tenn. 290, 345 S.W.2d 874 (1961).
40. 360 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. 1962).
41. 360 S.W.2d at 41; 208 Tenn. at 301, 345 S.W.2d at 879.
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determine that the annexation is either "necessary" or "reasonable."
The issue is whether the question of the reasonableness of the an-
nexation is "fairly debatable."
In the Columbia case considerable evidence was taken so that the
court was in position to say "not only is the fact question of the
necessity of this annexation a fairly debatable question, but it seems
to us that the weight of the evidence clearly preponderates in favor
of the reasonableness and necessity of these ordinances."4 The pro-
cedure followed in the Nashville case was more unusual. The chan-
cellor sustained the city's demurrer. The supreme court affirmed
this ruling by judicially noticing the contents of a planning study
which would provide a rational basis for the action of the city council,
thereby making the question of reasonableness "fairly debatable."
43
In neither case did the court examine the question of whether all of
the annexed territory was needed. Nor did it specifically discuss
factors which courts sometimes consider in reviewing the reason-
ableness of annexations such as the number of residents of the
annexed area earning their living in the cities, the need for central
administration of the whole area, the sewage, water, garbage collec-
tion and fire protection needs of the area, the effect upon the city if
these services are not provided and the capacity of the city to provide
the services.4
A large number of considerations may enter into the local political
decision concerning annexation-public opinion, need for municipal
revenue, comparative tax rates, land use patterns of the city and the
annexed area, the quality of schools, sewage and water services, fire
and police protection, racial characteristics, party politics, even
religion. It is easy to see why the court wants to stay out of
this type of political controversy. It is difficult to formulate any
judicial principles for evaluating the reasonableness of annexation.
While an argument can be made that the court should attempt to
provide some principles governing reasonableness,45 from my own
point of view the court is right to devise a standard that will allow
the political solution to stand unless the annexation is irrational and
amounts to a clear abuse of legislative power.
42. 360 S.W.2d at 41-42.
43. But cf. State ex tel. Campbell v. Mayor & Aldermen, 207 Tenn. 593, 341 S.W.2d
733 (1960) and City of Knoxville v. State ex tel. Graves, 207 Tenn. 558, 341 S.W.2d
718 (1960), indicating the question of reasonableness of annexation ordinance cannot
be decided on demurrer.
44. See, e.g., Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309
(1941).





Previous sections of this article and the survey article dealing with
constitutional law have discussed a number of the issues raised in
Frazer v. Carr,6 in which the supreme court sustained the consolida-
tion of Nashville and Davidson County. Two issues remain for
discussion: (1) the validity of the taxing plan for the new metro-
politan government established by its charter, and (2) the validity
of the provisions of the charter relating to the school system.
1. The Taxing Plan.-The general purpose of the metropolitan
charter is to merge the City of Nashville and Davidson County and
their separate agencies into one governmental unit with jurisdiction
co-extensive with the county. The boundaries of the old City of Nash-
ville are retained for taxing purposes, however. Under the charter the
old city is called the "Urban Services District," while the whole area
of the county including the Urban Services District is called the
"General Services District."47 These are taxing and service districts.
Property in the old city is subject to taxation in both districts. The
metropolitan tax assessor assesses the property for taxation in both
districts, and the metropolitan trustee collects the taxes for both.
The 1957 consolidation enabling act requires the metropolitan
charter to adopt this two-district taxing plan.4 In theory at least, its
purpose is to establish a different tax rate for property owners receiv-
ing services like sewage and fire protection not received by property
owners outside the urban services district. In fact, however, the
taxes paid under this plan in many instances do not reflect the
services actually received by the property owner. This situation arises
because the tax rates throughout each district are uniform though
services throughout each district are not uniform. For example, some
property owners in the general services district may receive sewage
and water while others do not. Yet the tax rate throughout the district
is the same.
An alternative to this taxing plan would be one which allows the
legislative body of the metropolitan government to create taxing
districts with different tax rates depending on the services received.
This would allow the local legislative body annually to change the
boundaries of the districts and levy taxes under differential tax rates
which reflect the services actually being received by the taxpayer at
46. 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962). The issues raised in this case relating to sus-
pension of general law and alteration of local office were discussed supra at pp. 806-08.
See Kirby, Constitutional Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VA'N. L. REv. 649, 650-
55 (1963) for discussion of the issue relating to delegation of legislative power to a
local charter commission.
47. METROPOLITAN GOVERNiMEN-r OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY TENNESSEE,
CH"TER § 1.03 (1962).
48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6 -3711(e)-(j) (Supp. 1962).
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the time. The draftsmen of the 1957 enabling act rejected this al-
ternative on the ground that it would probably violate article XI,
sections 28 and 29 of the state constitution which, in numerous cases,
have been interpreted to require that the tax rate throughout the
incorporated area of a municipality be "equal and uniform."49 In
order to avoid unconstitutionality, the draftsmen of the 1957 act
adopted the two-district approach requiring that the consolidation
charter establish an urban services district co-extensive with the
old city and a general services district co-extensive with the county.
Since the adoption of the 1957 act, there has been some concern that
this plan may likewise be invalid in view of the fact that it does
provide for a measure of differential taxation within the same munici-
pality by creating two taxing districts with different tax rates.
The supreme court upheld this two-district taxing plan in Frazer
v. Carr, rejecting the argument that it violates the uniformity require-
ment of section 28 of the constitution. The court reasoned that "the
needs and services of the two [districts] are different, thereby re-
quiring a different tax rate" and to charge the same tax rate to
property owners who do not receive similar services "actually ignores
the principle of equal and uniform taxation."50
The real significance of the opinion lies in the fact that it may
indicate the court is willing to accept a plan of differential property
taxation based on services received. The broad language of the
opinion and the court's recognition of the unfairness of requiring
property owners to pay the same taxes when they do not receive
approximately the same services suggests that the court may accept
a plan of differential taxation which more accurately reflects these
services. Many other states allow such differential taxation under
similar constitutional provisions,51 and perhaps the obstruction to
effective local government caused by a narrow reading of section 28
of the constitution can now be removed in Tennessee.
2. The Metropolitan School System.-In upholding the legislative
design for public education adopted by the Nashville Metropolitan
Charter, the court removed another obstruction to effective local
government in metropolitan areas. The effect of this portion of the
opinion is to allow metropolitan county governments established
under the 1957 enabling act to escape the rigid general laws applicable
49. TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28 provides in part as follows: "All property shall be
taxed according to its value ...so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout
the State." Section 29 says: "The General Assembly shall have the power to
authorize the several counties and incorporated towns of this State to impose taxes
. . . and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the principles
established in regard to State taxation."
50. 360 S.W.2d at 455-56.
51. See NEw-ousE, CONSTITuTONAL UNNFOaRMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAX-
ATION (Mich. Legal Studies Series 1959).
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to counties such as the general law requiring the superintendent of
schools to be elected by the county's legislative body or by the people
rather than by the board of education. If the court had decided that
metropolitan county-wide governments are required to follow the
general laws applicable to counties in formulating consolidation plans,
such governments would lose the flexibility always possessed by the
municipal form of government, thereby losing many of the advantages
of consolidation.
The court held that, while the charter provisions relating to the
school system do deviate from earlier general law applicable to
counties, they were adopted under the 1957 general enabling act which
allows the charter to merge or alter the duties of local officers. Thus,
with respect to consolidated governments, the 1957 act and charter
provisions adopted under it supercede and render inapplicable earlier
general law governing the county form of government.
52
C. Utility Districts
Two cases raise the question: how you get rid of utility districts
whose services are unsatisfactory? The utility district act gives each
utility district incorporated under it an exclusive franchise in the area
it serves until revoked by the county legislative body and the power
to sell its services within a city if it is granted permission to do so by
the cityP3 The county legislative body apparently cannot modify the
exclusive nature of the franchise (1) unless the district fails "to furnish
any of the services which it is . . . authorized to furnish," or (2)
unless "the public convenience and necessity requires other additional
services."'' In order to prevent local acts which interfere with utility
districts incorporated under it, the act, which provides a method for
incorporation by the county legislative body, declares that it is
"complete in itself' and other laws do "not apply."5
In one survey case, a city, despite a local act prohibiting it from
granting exclusive franchises, permitted a natural gas utility district
incorporated under the utility district act to extend its services to
customers within the city.56 The city then apparently decided to let
another utility provide the same services and argued it could do so
because the local act prevented it from granting an exclusive fran-
52. 360 S.W.2d at 456.
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2607 (Supp. 1962).
54. Ibid.
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2627 (1956). But the supreme court has allowed the
creation of utility districts by private act, Whedbee v. Godsey, 190 Tenn. 140, 228
S.W.2d 91 (1950).




chise. The utility district argued that once it extended its services
within the city it had an exclusive franchise under the general utility
district act until revoked by the county legislative body. Relying on
an earlier case saying that the general act provides the only method
for modifying an exclusive franchise, the supreme court adopted the
utility district's argument and observed that the city's remedy is to ask
the county legislative body to modify the exclusive nature of the dis-
trict's franchise within the city.
It appears from the opinion that the area of the city where the
district extended its services was not actually within the boundaries
of the utility district as incorporated. If so, the holding is question-
able because the exclusive franchise feature of the act applies only
"in the area embraced by the district," not to the area outside the
district into which the utility is permitted to extend its services.51
In the other case, the question arose whether the section of the
utility district act allowing the county legislative body to modify an
exclusive franchise authorizes the legislative body to detach territory
from one utility district and add it to anothers8 The supreme court
held that the legislature did not delegate this power to the county
legislative body and indicated that the correct procedure, if condi-
tions allowing franchise modification are present, is for the county
court to modify the original district's exclusive franchise, permitting
the other utility district to compete by extending its services into
the area formerly served exclusively by the original district.
III. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS-ALLOCATION OF TVA TAx
EQUIVALENTS BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTY
The Tennessee Valley Authority sells at wholesale rates the power
generated at its various installations to municipalities operating systems
for distributing electric power to consumers and controls the resale
price and the disposition of electricity revenues by the municipalities.
TVA controls resale prices and the disposition of revenues by con-
tract in order to keep electric power rates low and to curtail the
pressures on municipalities to maintain high rates and drain off the
revenues for general municipal purposes. But section 13 of the TVA
act does allow municipalities to use some electricity revenues for
general municipal purposes by authorizing TVA to insert in its con-
tracts provisions permitting
the resale of power at rates which may include ... tax equivalent payments
to the municipality in lieu of State, county, and municipal taxes upon any
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2607 (Supp. 1962).
58. Consolidated Gray-Fordtoen-Colonial Heights Util. Dist. v. O'Neill, 209 Tenn.
342, 354 S.W.2d 63 (1962).
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distribution system or property owned by the municipality ... conditioned
upon a proper distribution by the municipality of any amounts collected
by it in lieu of state or county taxes upon any such distribution system or
property; it being the intention of Congress that either the municipality or
the state in which the municipality is situated shall provide for the proper
distribution to the state and county of any portion of tax equivalent so
collected by the municipality in lieu of state or county taxes upon any such
distribution system or property.59
TVA has exercised the power granted in this section by inserting a
provision in its contracts allowing the municipality to receive and use
without encumbrance electricity revenues equal to city and county
property taxes which would be paid if the municipality's electrical
distribution properties were privately owned. Neither TVA through
its contracts, nor the state by general legislation, requires the munici-
pality to pay over to the county the tax equivalent money which is
calculated by applying the county tax rate to the value of these
properties.60 Thus, the municipality establishes the value of its
electrical distribution system by traditional methods of evaluation,
applies the municipal tax rate and the county tax rate, and then refuses
to turn over to the county the electricity revenues equal to county
taxes. In fact, there is a question whether municipalities could pay
over these county tax equivalents if they wanted to because state law
does not authorize such generosity, nor does it authorize the counties
to accept such payments.61
City of Tullahoma v. Coffee Count y62 is a declaratory judgment
action in the federal court to determine whether section 13 of the
TVA act requires a city to pay over to the county those TVA tax
equivalents it receives by applying the county tax rate to the value of
its electrical distribution properties. All parties apparently concede
that under section 13 TVA could enter into contracts which have no
provision for the payment of tax equivalents of any type to munici-
palities. It could allow municipalities to charge high rates and use
their revenues as they see fit. But when TVA does permit payments
measured by both city and county tax rates, must the payments be
conditioned on distribution to the county of its share? The federal
district court held that this condition is mandatory rather than per-
missive under the act and that TVA is required to insert such a
provision in its contracts with municipalities. The court further
declared that, since TVA has failed to place this requirement in its
59. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 831(L) (1958).
60. See Tennessee Revenue Bond Law, TErN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1301 to -1318
(1956) and Tennessee Municipal Electric Plant Law, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1501 to
-1537 (1956).
61. See the authorities cited in note 60 supra.
62. 204 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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contracts, the county can recover its share of the tax equivalents from
the municipality in the federal court. The case has now been argued
on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and is awaiting decision.
63
The federal district court overlooked, and the parties have not
raised in their briefs on appeal, the serious questions of constitutional
law and federal jurisdiction which underlie the issue of statutory
construction. While Congress certainly has the power to authorize
TVA to place contractual conditions upon the sale of power to mu-
nicipalities, does Congress or the federal court have the power to
require or order one unit of local government to pay money in its
general fund derived from electricity revenues to another unit of
local government in the absence of such a clause in the contract-
when neither local government is authorized under state law to pay
over or receive the revenues? This is a difficult and unexplored
question of federal-state-local relations which deserves thoughtful
treatment. We will leave it for next year's survey article to consider
the question in detail after the Tullahoma case is decided on appeal.
63. City of Tullahoma v. Coffee County, appeal docketed, No. 15,078, 6th Cir.,
1962,
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